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Abstract
Security metrics present the security level of a system or a network
in both qualitative and quantitative ways. In general, security metrics
are used to assess the security level of a system and to achieve secu-
rity goals. There are a lot of security metrics for security analysis, but
there is no systematic classification of security metrics that is based
on network reachability information. To address this, we propose a
systematic classification of existing security metrics based on network
reachability information. Mainly, we classify the security metrics into
host-based and network-based metrics. The host-based metrics are
classified into metrics “without probability” and “with probability”,
while the network based metrics are classified into “path-based” and
“non-path based”. Finally, we present and describe an approach to
develop composite security metrics and it’s calculations using a Hierar-
chical Attack Representation Model (HARM) via an example network.
Our novel classification of security metrics provides a new methodol-
ogy to assess the security of a system.
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1 Introduction
Researchers from research institutions, governments and industries have been
working on developing and distributing security metrics. For instance, the
Center for Internet Security (CIS) [1] proposed and categorised security met-
rics into management, technical and operational metrics. The National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [2] proposed nine security metrics
into implementation, effectiveness/efficiency and impact. Others such as
Idika and Bhargava [3] proposed and classified security metrics into decision,
assistive and so on. Most of these efforts to categorise and classify security
metrics are based on the target audience and personal intuitions. Therefore,
it is important to develop a systematic classification of security metrics that
is based on network reachability information. There are a number of security
metrics which are used for network security assessment [3–7]. But none of
them are capable of representing the overall security level of the network [8].
Thus it is important we combine different security metrics to present and
analyse the diverse facet of the security posture.
In this paper, we classify the existing security metrics based on network
reachability information, and describe an approach to develop new security
metrics by combining the existing security metrics. Our novel classification
provides a new methodology to assess the security of a system. It also pro-
vides insight as to how and when a security metric should be used. The main
contributions of this paper are:
• to classify existing cyber security metrics;
• to perform security analysis using the existing security metrics;
• to describe an approach to developing composite security metrics; and
• to formally define the composite security metrics.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces related
work on existing classification of security metrics. In Section 3, we present
a novel classification of the existing security metrics. In Section 4, we de-
scribe and analyse the security of an example network using existing security
metrics. In Section 5, we present our new composite security metrics with
examples. And finally, we conclude the paper and outline the future work in
Section 6.
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2 Related Work
There are a few research on the classification of security metrics. Most clas-
sification methods are based on organisation’s point of view [9]. For in-
stance, Savola [10] proposed three categories of security metrics; namely, (i)
business-level security metrics, (ii) metrics for information security manage-
ment (ISM) in organisations, and (iii) dependability and trust metrics for
products, systems and services. The business-level security metrics are busi-
ness goals directed and are used for cost-benefit security analysis in organi-
sations. The information security management metrics are used to evaluate
the ISM security controls, plans and policies, and are divided into three sub-
categories (i.e., management, operational and information system technical
security metrics). The dependability and trust metrics are used to assess
the organisation’s trust, relationships and dependability issues [11]. In gen-
eral, this classification only addresses the security needs of companies that
produce information and telecommunication technology products, systems
or services.
Vaughn et al. in [12] presented two categories of security metrics (organ-
isational security metrics and metrics for technical target assessment). The
organisational security metrics assess the organisation’s security assurance
status (the metrics in this category include security effectiveness, operational
readiness for security incidents and information assurance program develop-
ment metric). The metrics for technical target assessment are used to assess
the security capabilities of a technical system (it is further divided into met-
rics for strength assessment and metrics for weakness assessment [12]). This
classification is tailored towards an organisation’s needs.
Pendleton et al. [13] classified security metrics into four categories, namely:
metrics for measuring the system vulnerabilities, metrics for measuring the
defences, metrics for measuring the threats, and metrics for measuring the
situations. The metrics for measuring vulnerabilities are intended to quantify
the enterprise and computer systems vulnerabilities through their user’s pass-
word, software vulnerabilities, and the vulnerabilities of the cryptographic
keys they use. The metrics for measuring defences is aimed to quantify the
countermeasure deployed in an enterprise via the effectiveness of blacklisting,
the ability of attack detection, the effectiveness of software diversification,
and the overall effectiveness of these countermeasures. The metrics for mea-
suring threats are aimed to assess the threats against an enterprise through
the threat of zero-day attacks, the power of individual attacks and the sophis-
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tication of obfuscation. And the metrics for measuring the situations aims to
assess situations via security investments, security states and security inci-
dents. This classification is centred on the perspective between attackers and
defenders in enterprise systems. Other classifications provided by industries
such as the NIST [2], the CIS [1] and the Workshop on Information Security
System Scoring and Ranking are exclusively geared towards cyber defence
administrations and operations [13].
To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous work on the classifica-
tion of security metrics based on the network reachability information. Here,
we focus on classifying existing security metrics based on network reachabil-
ity information and propose an approach to develop new set of cyber security
metrics by combining the existing metrics.
3 Classification of Security Metrics
Based on network reachability information, we mainly classify security met-
rics into two types: host-level metrics and network-level metrics, as shown
in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Classification of Security Metrics.
The host-level metrics do not use any network level information (e.g.,
reachability, protocols, etc) whereas the network-level metrics take into ac-
count network structure, protocol and reachability information to quantify
the security of a system. We describe the host-level metrics in Section 3.1
and the network-level metrics in Section 3.2, respectively.
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3.1 Host-based Security Metrics
The host-level metrics are used to quantify the security level of individual
hosts in a network. We further classify the host-level metrics into two types:
“without probability” and “with probability”. The reasons for this classifi-
cation are: (i) sometimes it is infeasible to find a probability value for an
attack, and (ii) some analysis and optimisation can be done with or without
probability assignments as described in [14].
3.1.1 Metrics without probability values
We summarise the metrics “without probability” in Table 1. Examples of
metrics without probability values are attack impact, attack cost, structural
important measured [15], mincut analysis [15], mean-time-to-compromise
(MTTC) [16,17], mean-time-to-recovery (MTTR) [18], Mean-Time-to-First-
Failure (MTFF) [19], Mean-Time-to-Breach (MTTB) [20], The return on
investment [21], The return on attack [21], etc.
3.1.2 Metrics with probability values
Conversely, the security metrics with probability include probability security
metric [7], Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) metrics [23] etc.
An attack graph (AG) is an acyclic directed graph to represent all possible
ways for an attacker to reach a target vulnerability. Wang et al. [7] proposed
an AG-based security metric that incorporates the likelihood of potential
multi-step attacks combining multiple vulnerabilities in order to reach the
attack goal. We summarise the metrics with probability in Table 2.
3.2 Network-based Security Metrics
This category of metrics uses the structure of a network to aggregate the
security property of the network. We further classify these metrics into two
types: path based and non-path based metrics (according to the use of path
information).
3.2.1 Non-Path Based Metrics
In non-path based metrics, the structure and attributes of a network are
not considered; instead, the security of a network is quantified regardless
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Table 1: Description of Metrics without Probability Values.
Metrics Description
Attack Cost [15] is the cost spent by an attacker to successfully
exploit a vulnerability (i.e., security weakness)
on a host.
Attack Impact [22] is the quantitative measure of the potential
harm caused by an attacker to exploit a
vulnerability.
Mean-time-to-Compromise (MTTC) [16,17]
is used to measure how quickly a network can
be penetrated. This type of metrics produces
time values as end results.
Structural Important Measure [15] is used to qualitatively determine the most
critical event (attack, detection or mitigation)
in a graphical attack model. This metric is
useful when the probability of event such as
attack, detection or mitigation are unknown.
Mean-Time-to-Recovery (MTTR) [18]
is used to assess the effectiveness of a network
to recovery from an attack incidents. It is
defined as the average amount of time required
to restore a system out of attack state. The
shorter the time, the less impact is the attack
on the overall performance of the network.
The Return on Attack [21]
is defined as the gain the attacker expects from
successful attack over the losses he sustains due
to the countermeasure deployed by his target.
This security metric is from the attacker
perspective and it used by organisations to
evaluate the effectiveness of a countermeasure
in discouraging a certain type of intrusion
attempts [21].
Table 2: Description of Metrics with Probability Values.
Metrics Description
Probability of vulnerability exploited [24]
is used to assess the likelihood of an attacker
exploiting a specific vulnerability on a host. This
takes into account the severity of the host
vulnerability.
Probability of attack detection [15]
is used to assess the likelihood of a
countermeasure to successfully identify the
event of an attack on a target.
Probability of host compromised [25]
is used to assess the likelihood of an attacker to
successfully compromise a target
CVSS [23,26]
is an industry standard used to assess the severity
of computer vulnerabilities. Details of the CVSS
probability is provided in [27].
of the network structure. One example of this type of metrics is Network
Compromise Percentage (NCP) metric [30]. The NCP metric is defined in
Table 4. This metric indicates the percentage of network assets an attacker
can compromise. The aim of the NCP metric is to minimise this percentage.
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Table 3: Description of Path based Metrics.
Metrics Description
Attack Shortest Path [4, 28]
is the smallest distance from the attacker to the
target. This metric represents the minimum
number of hosts an attacker will use to
compromise the target host.
Number of Attack Paths [28]
is the total number of ways an attacker can com-
promise the target. The higher the number, the
less secure the network.
Mean of Attack Path Lengths [29]
is the average of all path lengths. It gives the
expected effort that an attacker may use to
breach a network policy.
Normalised Mean of Path Lengths [3]
This metric represents the expected number of
exploits an attacker should execute in order to
reach the target.
Standard Deviation of Path Lengths [3] is used to determine the attack paths of interest.
A path length that is two standard deviations
below the mean of path length metric is
considered the attack paths of interest and can
be recommended to the network administrator for
monitoring and consequently for patching [3].
Mode of Path Lengths [3] is the attack path length that occurs most
frequently. The Mode of Path Lengths metric
suggests a likely amount of effort an attacker
may encounter.
Median of Path Lengths [3] this metric is used by network administrator to
determine how close is an attack path length
to the value of the median path length (i.e. path
length that is at the middle of all the path
length values). The values that falls below the
median are monitored and considered for
network hardening [3].
Attack Resistance Metric [6]
is use to assess the resistance of a network confi-
guration based on the composition of measures of
individual exploits. It is also use for assessing and
comparing the security of different network
configurations [6].
Another example is a set of vulnerabilities that allows an attacker to use
them as entry points to a network. For instance, web-services running on
a host could be the very first targets for an attacker to compromise. The
weakest adversary (WA) metric is also a network based metric that is use to
assess the security of a network. In the WA metric, a network configuration
that is vulnerable to a stronger set of attribute is define as more secure than
a network configuration that is vulnerable to a weaker set of initial attacker
attributes [5].
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Table 4: Description of Non-Path Based Metrics.
Metrics Description
Network Compromise Percentage [30]
is the metric that quantifies the
percentage of hosts on the network
on which an attacker can obtain an
user or administration level privilege.
Weakest Adversary [5]
is used to assess the security strength of a
network in terms of the weakest part of
the network that an attacker can
successfully penetrate.
Vulnerable Host Percentage [31]
is used to assess the overall security of
a network. This metric quantifies the
percentage of hosts with vulnerability on a
network. The higher the metric value,
the less is the security level of the network.
3.2.2 Path Based Metrics
Path based metrics use the reachability information of a network (for ex-
ample, reachability between hosts, shortest path from a host X to a host
Y, and so on) to quantify the security level of the network. We summarise
some of these metrics in Table 3, which include Shortest Path (SP) met-
rics [4], Number of Paths (NP) metrics [28], Mean of Path Length (MPL)
metrics [29], Normalised Mean of Path Lengths (NMPL) Metrics [3], Stan-
dard Deviation of Paths Lengths (SDPL) Metrics [3], Mode of Path Lengths
(MoPL) Metrics [3] and Median of Path Lengths (MePL) Metrics [3].
4 Network Configurations and System Model
The example network is shown in Figure 2. The network consists of two
firewalls with an attacker located outside the network. Here, the firewall 1 is
use to allow secure connections from the Internet to the hosts in the network
while firewall 2 is use to allow secure connections to the database (i.e., h7).
We assume the goal of the attacker is to compromise the database. We denote
hosts in the network as hi, where i = 1, 2, 3..., n (a unique identifier for each
host in the network). Table 6 shows the firewall rules used for the example
network. For simplicity, we selected only one vulnerabilities for each host
in the network from the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [23]
which we list in Table 7.
We use the example network and existing security metrics to perform se-
curity assessment via the Hierarchical Attack Representation Model (HARM)
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[32]. We describe the HARM and assumptions of the example network in
Section 4.1 and Section 4.2, respectively.
The example network has a finite set of hosts H and a finite set of vul-
nerabilities V . The following notations are used for the security assessment.
Table 5: Notations for the security assessment.
Notation Meaning
AP is all possible paths from an attacker to a target
ap is an attack path which includes a sequence of hosts
f is a function that identifies the length of the attack path that occurs most
frequently
ach is the minimum cost spent by an attacker who successfully compromises
the host h
aimh is the maximum potential loss caused by an attacker who successfully
compromises the host h
prh is the probability of an attacker to successfully compromise the host h
acap is the minimum cost spent by an attacker who successfully compromises
an ap
aimap is the maximum potential loss caused by an attacker who successfully
compromises an ap
prap is the probability of an attacker to successfully compromise an ap
apex is the attack path that an attacker is attempting to exploit ex
ash is the asset value associated with a host h
sv is the set of vulnerable hosts
• A graphical security model - HARM denoted as GSM
• Each host h ∈ H has a name hname, a vulnerability v ∈ V and a set of
security metrics hmetrics⊆{ph, iamh, ach, mttch, ash}.
• Each vulnerability v ∈ V has a name vname.
• Each attack path ap ∈ AP has an index apindex.
4.1 The HARM
We use the HARM to analyse the network security. The HARM is a two-layer
model in which the upper layer (AG) represents the network reachability in-
formation and the lower layer (AT) represents the vulnerability information.
We defined the AT [33] for HARM as a 5-tuple at = (A,B, c, g, root).
Here, A is a set of components which are the leaves of at and B is a set of
gates which are the inner nodes of at. We require A∩B = ∅ and root∈A∪B.
Function c: B→P(A∪B) describes the children of each inner node in at (we
assume there are no cycles). Function g: B→{AND,OR} describes the type
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of each gate. The representation of the AT ath associated to the host h∈H
is given as ath: A⊆hvuls (where vuls is the host vulnerability). This means
that the vulnerabilities of a node are combined using AND and OR gates.
We defined the AG for HARM [33] as a directed graph ag = (N,E)
where N is a finite set of components and E⊆N×N is a set of edges between
components.
The HARM of the example network is shown in Figure 2(b). Other
graphical security models such as those suggested by Noel and Jajodia [34]
and Ou et al. [35] can also be used.
Table 6: Example network: firewall rules.
Host accept traffic from
h1 Internet
h2 Internet
h3 h1
h4 h3
h5 h2
h6 h2
h7 h4, h5, h6
4.2 Assumptions for the example network
We make the following assumptions for the example network:
• An attacker knows the (or has knowledge of) reachability information
from the attacker to the target (that is h7).
• Each host has only one vulnerability but more vulnerabilities can be
modelled as in the work [22,36].
• Exploiting a vulnerability grants the attacker the root privilege of the
host.
• The attacker uses vulnerability scanners such as Nessus [37], Nmap [38],
etc to discover all the network vulnerabilities.
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(a) Example Network.
(b) HARM of the Example Network.
Figure 2: An Example Network and the HARM
4.3 Security Analysis of the Example Network
We use existing security metrics to assess the security of the example net-
work. For simplicity, we selected a few vulnerabilities from the Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [23] which we list in Table 7.
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Table 7: List of Vulnerabilities.
h name v name CVE-ID CVSS BS prh aimh ach ash
h1 v1 CVE-2016-2386 7.5 0.75 7 8 40
h2 v2 CVE-2016-2040 3.5 0.35 4 4.2 21
h3 v3 CVE-2016-0059 4.3 0.43 5 5 2 25
h4 v4 CVE-2015-7974 2.1 0.21 3 3.5 17.5
h5 v5 CVE-2015-2542 9.3 0.93 9 9.2 46
h6 v6 CVE-2014-2706 7.1 0.71 6.5 7.5 37.5
h7 v7 CVE-2013-2035 4.4 0.44 4.3 5.5 27.5
In Table 7, the host-based metrics “without probability” values; attack
cost and attack impact have metric value of 5.50 and 4.30 for target host
h7, respectively. These metrics present the minimum cost and the potential
loss for the attacker to successfully compromise a host h7, respectively. The
probability of attack success metric (i.e., a metric “with probability”) is –
0.44. This metric presents the probability that an attacker will successfully
exploit the host h7. The lower the metric value, is the lower the chances that
the attacker will succeed in exploiting the target host.
To calculate the network base metrics, we consider a set of all attack paths
AP (i.e. ap1 = (h1, h3, h4, h7), ap2 = (h2, h5, h7), and ap3 = (h2, h6, h7)) for
a given target, h7. We compute the network based metrics in Table 8 and
Table 9.
Table 8: Metrics Values for “Path based Metrics”.
Metrics Name Formulae Value
Shortest Attack Path SP (GSM) = min
ap∈AP
|ap| 3.00
Number of Attack Paths NP (GSM) = |AP | 3.00
Mean of Attack Path Lengths MPL(GSM) =
∑
ap∈AP
|ap|
NP (GSM)
3.30
SDPL SDPL(GSM) =
√ ∑
ap∈AP
(|ap|−MPL(GSM))2
NP (GSM)
0.47
Mode of Path Lengths MoPL(GSM) = f
ap∈AP
(|ap|) 3.00
Attack Resistance R(ei) =
{
r(ei) + R(ej) conjuctive
r(ei) +
1
R(ek)
−1+R(el)−1
disjunctive
8.81
In Table 8, the value of the shortest path metric is 3. Based on this
metric, an administrator can prioritise the network hardening measure by
patching vulnerabilities along the shortest path — in this case, it is the
attack path ap2 and ap3. The number of paths (NP) metric which also
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yield the value 3.00 indicates the security strength of the network. In the
NP metric, the higher the paths number is the lower is the security level.
The mean of paths length yield 3.30. This security metrics show the overall
network security level. In the mean of path lengths metric, the HARM with
higher metric value is recorded as less secure. The standard deviation of
path lengths is 0.47. According to this metric, the path length that is two
standard deviations below the mean of path lengths metric is considered to
be the attacker’s path of interest and regarded as vulnerabilities in hosts
along the path are recommended for patching. In this case the ap2 and ap3
are both two standard deviation below the MPL metric (their two standard
deviation value is - 0.64 for both metrics).
To compute the attack resistance metric, two basic operators (disjunctive
and conjunctive) described in Wang et al. [6] are used. We compute the
attack resistance metric based on the equation provided by Idika [39]. In the
equation, the function r represents the difficulty associated with an exploit
em. R represent the cumulative resistance of an exploit em by taking into
account all resistance values for ancestors of em. We use each host vulner-
ability value as the exploit value. In our calculation, the attack resistance
value is 8.81. This metric value indicates the network security level and the
ability of the network configuration to resist attack.
Table 9: Metrics Values for “non-path based metrics”.
Metrics Name Formulae Value
Network Compromise Percentage NCP (GSM) = 100×
∑
h∈apex
ash∑
h∈AP
ash
, apex ∈ AP 51.23%
Vulnerable Host Percentage V HP (GSM) = 100×
∑
h∈sv
h∑
h∈AP
h
, sv ∈ AP 100%
In Table 9, we compute the NCP metric. The NCP security metric is
for an AG that is not target oriented. In the NCP computation, we assume
the attacker is attempting to compromise the set of machines on ap1. In our
computation, the NCP metric yields a value of 51.23%. In the NCP metric
the more machines are compromised, the higher the NCP value. Hence, the
goal of the administrator is to reduce the NCP value. The vulnerable host
percentage metric yield a value of 100%. This is because all host in our ex-
ample network has one vulnerability. This security metric is used to compute
the percentage of host on a network that have at least one vulnerability.
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5 Composite Security Metrics
We propose an approach to develop new set of cyber security metrics called
composite security metrics. In these metrics, we combine individual metrics
to create a new metric (for example, we can combine attack impact and
attack path metric to form the impact on attack path metric, see Figure 3
for more examples). We will use the example network in Figure 2 to perform
security analysis using the composite security metrics. We demonstrate our
proposed composite metrics using four examples: (i). Impact on attack paths
(ii). Risk on attack paths (iii). Return on attack paths (iv). Probability of
attack success on paths
Figure 3: Examples of composite security metrics.
5.1 Impact on Attack Paths
The native metric (as one of the path-based metrics) used to create the
impact of paths is attack paths. We combine the attack path metrics with
the impact of each host in the path. We define the impact on attack path as
the cumulative quantitative measure of potential harm in an attack path. We
denote the metric as AIM and calculate it using Equation (3) and (4). The
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host attack impact is calculated by equation (2). The network-level value
AIM is then given by Equation (4).
aimb =

∑
a∈c(b)
aima,
b∈B
g(b)=AND
max
a∈c(b)
aima,
b∈B
g(b)=OR
(1)
aimh = aimroot (2)
aimap =
∑
h∈ap
aimh, ap ∈ AP (3)
AIM = max
ap∈AP
aimap (4)
The impact on path metric can reveal the impact of damage associated
with each attack path. A security administrator can use this metric to de-
termine which path to patch first. For instance, hosts in the path with the
highest impact value can be considered as the prioritised set of hosts to patch.
Using the example network, we use all the possible AP from Figure 2 to
compute the impact of path metrics.
aimap1 = aimh1 + aimh3 + aimh4 + aimh7
= 7 + 5 + 3 + 4.3
= 19.3
aimap2 = aimh2 + aimh5 + aimh7
= 4 + 9 + 4.3
= 17.3
aimap3 = aimh2 + aimh6 + aimh7
= 4 + 6.5 + 4.3
= 14.8
The AIM of the example network is 19.3. More detail of how to get the
CVSS impact values can be found in [40].
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5.2 Risk on Attack Paths
The Risk on attack paths is defined as the expected value of the impact
on an attack path. It is computed as the summation of the product of
the probability of attack success prh and the amount of damage aimh h
belonging to an attack path ap. The metric is denoted as R and calculate
it using Equation (8). The host risk metric is defined by equation (6). The
network-level value R is then given by Equation (8).
rb =

∑
a∈c(b)
pra × aima, b∈Bg(b)=AND
max
a∈c(b)
pra × aima, b∈Bg(b)=OR
(5)
rh = rroot (6)
rap =
∑
h∈ap
prh × aimh, ap ∈ AP (7)
R = max
ap∈AP
rap (8)
We compute the risk of paths metric for all the possible attack paths as
follows:
rap1 = prh1 × aimh1 + prh3 × aimh3 + prh4 × aimh4 + prh7 × aimh7
= (0.75× 7) + (0.43× 5) + (0.21× 3) + (0.44× 4.3)
= 9.92
rap2 = prh2 × aimh2 + prh5 × aimh5 + prh7 × aimH7
= (0.35× 4) + (0.93× 9) + (0.44× 4.3)
= 11.66
rap3 = prh2 × aimh2 + prh6 × aimh6 + prh7 × aimh7
= (0.35× 4) + (0.71× 6.5) + (0.44× 4.3)
= 7.91
This metric shows the level of risk associated with each attack path.
From our computed example HARM, the attack path ap2 (it’s risk is 11.66)
is considered as the path with the highest risk.
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5.3 Return on Attack Paths
The return on attack [21] is a metric used to quantify the benefit for the
attacker. A return on attack paths computes the benefit for an attacker
when the attacker successfully exploits all the vulnerabilities on a particular
attack path. From the defender’s point of view, the network administrator
can use this metric to reduce the attacker’s benefit by patching vulnerabilities
on the path(s) with a high value of ROA. We denote the metric as ROA and
it is calculated using Equation (12). The host return on attack metric is given
by equation (10). The network-level value ROA is then given by Equation
(12).
roab =

∑
a∈c(b)
pra × aima
aca
, b∈B
g(b)=AND
max
a∈c(b)
pra×aima
aca
, b∈B
g(b)=OR
(9)
roah = roaroot (10)
roaap =
∑
h∈ap
prh × aimh
ach
, ap ∈ AP (11)
ROA = max
ap∈AP
roaap (12)
We show how to compute return on attack paths below:
roaap1 =
prh1 × aimh1
ach1
+
prh3 × aimh3
ach3
+
prh4 × aimh4
ach4
+
prh7 × aimh7
ach7
=
0.25× 7
8
+
0.57× 5
5
+
0.79× 3
3.5
+
0.56× 4.3
5.5
= 1.91
roaap2 =
prh2 × aimh2
ach2
+
prh5 × aimh5
ach5
+
prh7 × aimh7
ach7
=
0.65× 4
4.2
+
0.07× 9
9.2
+
0.56× 4.3
5.5
= 1.12
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roaap3 =
prh2 × aimh2
ach2
+
prh6 × aimh6
ach6
+
prh7 × aimh7
ach7
=
0.65× 4
4.2
+
0.29× 6.5
7.5
+
0.56× 4.3
5.5
= 1.30
Return on attack paths quantifies the network security level from the
attacker’s perspective. From the example network scenario, the attack path
ap1 with metrics value 1.91 has the highest benefit to the attacker.
5.4 Probability of Attack Success on Paths
The probability of attack success on paths is developed by combining path
and probability of attack success. The probability of attack success on paths
represents the chances of an attacker successfully reaching the target through
an attack path. It is calculated by the equation (16) The host attack success
probability is defined by equation 14. We denote probability of attack success
on paths as Pr. The network-level value Pr is then given by Equation (16).
prb =

∏
a∈c(b)
pra,
b∈B
g(b)=AND
1−
∏
a∈c(b)
(1− pra), b∈Bg(b)=OR
(13)
prh = prroot (14)
prap =
∏
h∈ap
prh, ap ∈ AP (15)
Pr = max
ap∈AP
prap (16)
We show how to compute the probability of attack success on paths below:
prap1 = prh1 × prh3 × prh4 × prh7
= 0.75× 0.43× 0.21× 0.44
= 0.03
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prap2 = prh2 × prh5 × prh7
= 0.35× 0.93× 0.44
= 0.14
prap3 = prh2 × prh6 × prh7
= 0.35× 0.71× 0.44
= 0.11
In this scenario, ap2 with metric value 0.14 has the highest probability of
a successful attack and therefore it is the Pr. The closer the Pr value is to
1, the higher is the likelihood that an attacker will succeed in exploiting the
target.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have described the existing security metrics for cyber secu-
rity assessment. We have used the network structure and reachability infor-
mation to classify the existing metrics into host and network based security
metrics. We also use the existing security metrics to carry out security anal-
ysis. In addition, we described an approach to developing composite security
metrics and finally, we formally defined some composite security metrics.
Our classification of security metrics does not capture dynamic security
metrics. Thus, we need to incorporate the dynamic security metrics into the
proposed classification.
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